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reference either to adopted children or to designated heirs. Reference is
only to children and lineal descendants. This is true in most jurisdic-
tions. The court concluded that adopted children and designated heirs
are meant to be included in the statute through the use of the doctrine
of pari matera. Laws part materia, or concerning the same subject
matter, are to be construed in reference to each other-Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 2454. The court cited Cochrel v. Robinson, supra, as
authority for interpreting the statute of descent and distribution and the
statute of designation of heir as being pari materia. The use of this doc-
trine is well established. Porter v. Rohrer, 95 Ohio St. 9o , 1 5 N.E.
616 (i916); The Ohio River Power Co. v. City of Steubenville, 99
Ohio St. 421, 124 N.E. 246 (1919) ; Maxfield, Treas. v. Brooks, i1o
Ohio St. 566, 144 N.E. 725 (1924); Chapek v. City of Lakewood,
ii Ohio App. 203, 30 Ohio C.A. 541 (1919). Most jurisdictions
interpret the words children and issue as Ohio does. In the Matter of
the Estate of Newman, 75 Cal. 213, 7 Am. St. Rep. 146, 16 Pac. 887
(1888) ; Power v. Hafley, supra; In re Cadwell's estate, supra; In re
Walworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322, 82 Adt. 7 (1912). But the holdings
are not entirely uniform. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N.H. 407, 14 Ad.
557 (I888); Stanley v. Chandler et al, 53 Vt. 619 (1881); New
York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Viele, 16i N.Y. II, 55 N.E. 311
(i899). The objection that inheritance is diverted into a foreign line,
which is made against inheriting through a declarant, cannot be made
here. There is ample authority to justify the court's dictum. Kroff v.
.dmrhein et al, 94 Ohio St. 282, 114 N.E. 267 (1916); Gray et al v.
Holmes et al, 57 Kan. 217, 45 Pac. 596 (1896); Fiske v. Lawton,
124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913); Bernero v. Goodwin et al,
267 Mo. 427, 184 S.W. 74 (i916); In re Webb's Estate, 250 Pa.
179, 95 Ad. 419 (915). Both the holding as to inheritance through
the declarant and the dictum as to inheritance from him are well sup-
ported in principle and by the decisions in comparable adoption cases.
JEROME H. BROOKS
EVIDENCE
INFERENCE ON AN INFERENCE
One Hozian, the plaintiff, an employee of the Cleveland Window
Cleaning Company, was injured by a crane while cleaning windows in
the defendant's factory. At the trial the plaintiff testified that he had
noticed a person who he thought was a foreman giving instructions
to the workmen in the factory. The plaintiff's counsel asked Hozian
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to relate what the alleged foreman had said in his presence to Hozian's
foreman concerning the washing of windows. The defendant objected
on the ground that the foreman had not been sufficiently identified as a
person of authority in the defendant's employ, and, if he did possess
some authority, its nature and extent had not been shown. The object
of the plaintiff was to testify that the alleged foreman had said it would
be all right to go ahead with the window cleaning and the cranes would
not be operated. The trial court sustained the defendant's objection and
directed a verdict in its favor. Held: Such testimony would prima face
establish a master-servant relationship and the acts done by the servant
may be found to be within the scope of employment. Hozian v. Crucible
Steel Casting Co., 132 Ohio St. 453, 9 N.E. (2d) 413, 9 Ohio Op.
375 (i937).
The plaintiff's testimony was apparently excluded in the trial court
because even with his statement it would require an inference by the
jury that the man was a foreman or a person with authority, and, even
if that inference were made, it would require a further inference that
this man had at least apparent authority to authorize the work that was
done. So stated, it would run counter to the often stated maxim that
you can not build an inference on an inference or a presumption on a
presumption.
The maxim is often stated in Ohio and in some other states. See,
note, 95 A.L.R. 167 (1935). Of course an increase in the number
of steps involved in reaching a conclusion from a certain statement
lessens our belief in the soundness of that conclusion. To use a popular
illustration, if the chances are two out of three that it will rain tonight,
and also two out of three that if it does rain the roof will leak, the
chances are nevertheless less than half that the water will get through
the roof tonight.
In Sobolo'utz v. The Lubric Oil Co., 107 Ohio St. 204, 14o N.E.
634 (1923), a witness testified that he saw the words "The Lubric" on
a truck that injured the plaintiff. The court held that it might be reas-
onable to infer that the defendant owned the truck, but the jury should
not be permitted to make the further inference that it was being operated
in furtherance of the defendant's business. See also, Lashure v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 31 Ohio App. i6i, i65 N.E. 305, 27 Ohio L. R. 577
(1928). In Mills Restaurant Co. v. Clark, 45 Ohio App. 25, i85
N.E. 470, 38 Ohio L. R. 113, 13 Ohio Abs. 698 (0933), the court
held that from the mere showing that the plaintiff had eaten sea food
in the defendant's restaurant the jury might infer that such food had
caused her illness but refused to allow them to draw the further infer-
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ence that the food was unwholesome when sold to her. See, Fenger v.
Fenger, 8 Ohio D. R. 407, 7 Bull. 304 (1882).
In Rowe v. dlabama Power Co., 232 Ala. 257, 167 So. 324
(1936), the plaintiff fell from the steps of a street car. The court held
that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury might infer that a
banana peel was on the steps of the car when the plaintiff got off but
refused to allow the jury to draw the further inference that the peel had
been there long enough to give notice to the operator of the car. See,
Fisher Bros. Co. v. Deluca, io Ohio Abs. 488 (193). In W'Vellman
v. IVales, 97 Vt. 437, 129 Atl. 317 (1925) it was held that an infer-
ence that the defendant's car had struck the deceased did not warrant
the further inference that he had been negligent in doing so. In Card-
inale v. Kump, 309 Mo. 241, 274 S.W. 437 (1925), it was held
that the plaintiff could not establish negligence by proving a scar in his
eyeball which might have been caused by a cut or an infection from
bacteria and then ask a jury to infer that the scar was produced by
a cut, that the defendant caused the cut and that the cut caused the
loss of the eye.
Yet many things that we do every day are based on a chain of
inferences. If we notice that a traffic light is green we infer that drivers
traveling in the other direction will see a red light and that having seen
it, they will stop at the intersection. Hence we feel we are acting with
due regard for our safety in crossing the street. From the fact that a
person has lived in a certain environment we infer that he has acquired
certain traits and having acquired these traits we infer that he will react
to certain stimuli. We infer that persons using certain terms know
their meaning and from their use of the term we infer they intended
the term to carry that meaning.
Wigmore vigorously attacks the maxim that an inference can not
be built on an inference saying, "There is no such rule; nor can be. If
there were, hardly a single trial could be adequately prosecuted. For
example, on a charge of murder, the defendant's gun is found dis-
charged; from this we infer that he discharged it; and from this we
infer that it was his bullet which struck and killed the deceased. Or, the
defendant is shown to have been sharpening a knife; from this we argue
that he had a design to use it upon the deceased; and from this we argue
that the fatal stab was the result of this design. In these and in innum-
erable daily instances we build up inference upon inference and yet no
court ever thought of forbidding it. All departments of reasoning, all
scientific work, ever), day's life and every day's trials, proceed upon such
data. The judicial utterances that sanction the fallacious and imprac-
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ticable limitation, originally put forward without authority, must be
taken as valid only for the particular evidentiary facts therein relied
upon." i Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 41, p. 258 (1923).
Wigmore's views have been approved in many recent cases. In
Madden v. Z. & P. Tea Co., io6 Pa. Super. Ct. 474, 162 Ad. 687
(932), a dead mouse was found in a storage can where the plaintiff
kept the tea that she had purchased from the defendant the day before.
From this fact the jury was allowed to infer that the mouse was in the
tea when delivered to the plaintiff and then make the further inference
that the mouse so affected the tea which the plaintiff drank that it nause-
ated her and also that the tea rather than other food had caused her
illness. In Welsch v. Frusch Light and Power Co., 197 lo',,a 1012,
193 N.W. 427 (1923), the deceased was found dead near her washing
machine. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to go to
the jury from which it might be inferred that the deceased had received
an electrical shock and that such a shock had caused her death and
further that the wires were dangerously overcharged at the time.
Frequently statements that will require a combined inference are
admitted without any consideration of the maxim or any thought that
it is being violated. Thus a statement of intent to commit suicide has
been admitted. The jury is allowed to infer from those words that he
had the intent, and, if he is now dead, to infer that he carried it out and
killed himself. See, Commonwealth v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 1i9 At.
596 (1923). Statements of intent have been admitted to show com-
bined actions of the actor and another person. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillman, 145 U.S. 285, 36 L. Ed. 706, 12 Sup. Ct. 909 (1892);
State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 241, 161 Pac. 417 (1916).
Some courts which make use of the maxim attempt to solve the
difficult cases by declaring that the evidence supporting the first infer-
ence may be of such a character as to justify a finding of fact from which
the second inference may be drawn. See, Jones on Evidence (2nd ed.)
sec. 363-364 (1926); .Adamant Stone & Roofing Co. v. Vaughn, 7
Tenn. App. 170 (1928); and C. & 0. R. Co. v. Ware, 122 Va.
246, 95 S.E. 183 (1918); cf. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Van Orman, 41
Ohio App. 56, 179 N.E. 147, 35 Ohio L. R. 629, II Ohio Abs. 391
(931). But calling an inference a fact does not really change the
result. The court is permitting one inference to be drawn from another.
In the last analysis the ultimate question is whether there is enough
evidence to go to the jury. The more inferences that are involved in
the chain, the weaker the argument that the case should go to the jury.
If the court does not think the evidence is sufficient, the court will in-
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struct the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant. By stating that
you cannot build an inference on an inference the court has a ready
formula to reach the same result.
But if the court thinks the evidence is strong enough it will fre-
quently say that on the whole case the evidence is sufficient to make out
a prima facie case and should go to the jury. In the principal case the
supreme court so held, and the result seems justified, although it might
plausibly be argued that this involved the building of an inference on
an inference. In the Lubric Oil case, supra, the evidence was obviously
not so strong.
The maxim that you cannot build an inference on an inference
furnishes a test, the application of which may appear to be more definite
or certain than the broad and often difficult issue of whether there is
enough evidence to go to the jury. But it is submitted that this apparent
definiteness or certainty in the maxim is illusory.
HOBERT H. BUSH
WAIVER OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER SECTION
11494 OF THE OHIO GENERAL CODE
Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries. At the trial, on
direct examination, he testified that his general physical condition had
been good previous to the accident in which the injuries were allegedly
sustained. It was held that this voluntary testimony did not constitute
a waiver of the physician-patient privilege given in Ohio Gen. Code,
sec. I 1494. Consequently, a physician who had been called to contro-
vert the fact put in issue by plaintiff concerning plaintiff's physical con-
dition before the accident was not permitted to testify. It was also held
that testimony given by plaintiff on cross-examination in response to
questions was not voluntary within the meaning of the statute and so did
not constitute a waiver although the doctor and the treatment received
had been mentioned. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1 (1937).
To effect a satisfactory disposition of cases according to their merit
it may be assumed that all relevant evidence should be admissible. In
addition, if this were the only objective or consideration, all persons
should be under a duty to disclose all relevant facts. However, when
the benefits derived by society through enforcing this duty and permit-
ting testimony concerning all relevant facts are outweighed by the
harmful effects such testimony may have, then the evidence may be
excluded.
The old common law excluded much evidence, otherwise relevant,
